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INFORMAL REPLY BRIEF
INTRODUCTION:
Appellant gives notice that the following reply to the Respondent's Response, are specifically
challenging the Respondent's issues raised in their response. The Court can follow the arguments by
referring the following with the response brief.

FACTS
I.

If Plaintiff had standing they would have shown it to the court in the 3 years.

a.

There is not a credible note and deed in record.

b.

By the nature of the claimed PSA (Plaintiff) there is not a DOT which is viable.

c.

The PSA suspended trade and was disembodied 3 years before fabrication of the alleged chain

of title. PERJURY~
d.

If Indymac/onewest had sent the documents to the approved modification the Breinholts would

have been blissfully paying on it and the foreclosure would not have happened.
e.

If there had been a sale of the property at the time and place advertised the Breinholts would

have bought it. 45-1506(8): This Law action would not have happened.
2.

Res Judicata is not valid as there was not a "Final Judgment" to toll. Res Judicata is just

another legal dodge of having to prove standing.
3.

The Standard of Review Requires this Cow1 to Affirm or Dismiss this case.

a.

Standing/Jurisdiction has been raised from the beginning.

b.

Plaintiff has used every legal and illegal ploy known, including Default, to delay and avoid the

standing issue.
c.
d.

, Plaintiff is not a "Purchaser in good faith at the sale".

,

UNLESS STANDING IS FIRST ESTABLISHED, The unlawful Detainer Act Violates the
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Constitutional Rights of the Homeowners and the foundational question of Due ProcessISSUES ON APPEAL
l.

The court errors by not establishing standing/Jurisdiction before hearing Plaintiff's pleadings.

2.

Plaintiff has filed fabricated documents and obtained Judgments through Perjury and Fraud.

A,

Plaintiff is the PSA RAST 2005-Al5 DATED DECEMBER 1, 2005. Duetsche Bank is only

the trustee of the PSA plaintiff.
The Plaintiff was Dis-embodied March of 2006. The alleged Plaintiff has not existed for 8 years. This
is Fraud on the court and Appellants.
B.

Because of the nature of the Plaintiff it is a physical and legal impossibility that Plaintiff or the

trustee could have interest in the subject property. The alleged DOT is securitized and is void. The assets
of a PSA are governed under Secruities Law and no longer have any claim to real estate or real estate law.
3.

In the face of evidence to the contrary, the court abused its discretion in taking as true, the

A verments, false statements, and claims of Plaintiff's counseL Counsel has knowingly continued to assert

these lies to the court and to Appellants. Pe1jury 1
4.

The court abused its discretion by ruling the claims are undisputed.

5.

The points of the Counterclaim and affirmative defenses, along with all of the previous filings,

have not been heard by the Court, and are restated as plead herein.
6.

RES JUDICATA; The court abused its discretion in judging that the three points of Res

Judicata are met. See discussion of Res Judicata in the Response Motion for Summary Judgment p.9 and
herein.
7.

Tl;le court abused it? discretion by holding Appellant to the "same standards and as those

represented by counsel".
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a.

The court effors m rnling that Appellant is a Tenant in Suffrage.

b.

Plaintiff is not a "Purchaser in good faith at the sale".

c.

Deutsche Bank Illegally filed themselves on title while under stay in order to obtain position to

file an Unlawful Detainer.
d.

Plaintiff is fictitious.

e.

The evidence show that Plaintiff does not have standing.

f.

There is no evidence to show otherwise.

Respondents omitted the following;
1.

Breinholts entered into what was not a mortgage agreement but concealed as a Table-funded

Mortgage backed security agreement.
2.

Breinholts applied for and received approval for a loan modification. The documents were

never received or this case would never have happened.
3.

Indymac/Onewest bank dual processed the subject property by fab1icating chain of title and the

related documents at the same time.
4.

Breinholts, and two associates, went to the alleged foreclosure sale to purchase the property

and no sale was held. Neither party was presented and opportunity to purchase the property at a sale.
Deutsche Bank claims to have purchased the property at the alleged sale is Perjury!
5.

Respondent reversed the order of the filings of the Federal case 1; 10 CV 00466, on the

question of Standing/Jurisdiction in the Federal law, and the case on the sale CV OC 11351on the
improper sale under state law. The 466 case was file, before dismissing the 11351 case, litigating the real
issue of standing which had now come out.
6.

Breinholts did not ag~ee to dismissal with prejudice, but it ended up being dismissed with

prejudice.
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7.

The cases are on different subject material. The county case 1 I 351 on a fraudulent sale. The

Com1 did not issue a, "Final judgment" to toll res Judicata. None of the three standards are met as
discussed and restated herein.
8.

The federal case is still ongoing in the 9th circuit of appeals. Deutsche Bank filed themselves

on title between appeals even though there was injunction in place.
9.

Respondents claim that Appellants made the same allegations in the federal court could not be

true since the subjects are on two different subjects, and a final judgment has not been reached on either.
Res Judicata is not tolled.
10.

Breinholts have challenged Standing in this case and the one before the 9th circuit of appeals.

At no time in either case. has the court held a hearing in which to determine the standing of Deutsche bank
or the previous IndyMac/ Onewest Banks. Breinholts have raised this question from the very first and the
court has not follow procedure to arrive at the judgments rendered.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

When this Court reviews the decision of a distiict coun sitting in its capacity as an appellate court, the
standard of review is as follows:
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether there is substantial
and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's
conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are supported and the conclusions follow
therefrom and if the district court affi1med the magistrate's decision. We affirm the disttict court's decision
as a matter of procedure.

.

.

Bailey v. Bailey, I 53 Idaho Thus, this Court does not review the decision of the magistrate court. Id.
Rather, we are "procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the disttict court." Id. (quoting
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State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413,415,224, P. 3d 480 n.l (2009))
Prior to Losser, when this court reviewed a disuict court acting in its appellate capacity the standard of
review was: "when reviewing a decision of the dist1ict coU11 acting in its appellate capacity, this court will
review the record and the magistrate court's decision independently of, but with due regard for, the district
court's decision." Losser, 145 Idaho at 672, 183 P.3d at 760. After Losser, this cowt does not directly
review a magistrate COll11s decision. Id. Rather, it is bound to affirm or reverse the district court's decision.
See Bailey, 13 Idaho at 529,284 P.3d at 973: Korn, 148 Idaho at 415, 224 P.3d at 482 n.l. Pelayo v.
Pelayo, 14 Idaho 855,858-59, 303 P. 3d 214,217-18 2013.
Additionally, "(t)his Court freely reviews the interpretation of a statue and its application to the facts."
Sr. Lukes Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd v. Bd. Of Comm'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683,685
(2009) (citing Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,474, 163 P.3d 1183,1186 (2007)).

Whether a court lacks

Jurisdiction is a question of law .. over which appellate courts exercises free review." State v. Jones 140
Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) ( Citation Omitted).

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS: STANDING
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show: (I)
"an injury in fact--an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"; (2) "a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be fairly ...
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... the result of the independent
action of some third party not before the court"; and (3)"it must be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Lujan v. Defenders of
,Wildlife, 504 U.S.. 555, 560-61 (1992) (omissions in original) (internaL quotation marks ,and
citations omitted). Moreover, a litigant's interest cannot be based on the "generalized interest of
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all citizens in constitutional governance." Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418U.S. 208, 217 (1974); see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173-78 (1974)
(taxpayer's generalized grievance insufficient for standing).
B.

Respondent Claims that Appellants are raising new issues.

1.

From the Filing of this Unlawful detainer Complaint, Breinholts have been defending against

Standing. See Appellants Initial Brief, 2nd affirmative defenses and counterclaims, Motion for In Rem
hearing to show ... , Response to Motion for Summary Judgment.
2.

A discussion of the legal issue of standing as a "purchaser in Good faith at the sale"/unlawful

detainer is not new and has been the essence of the legal actions of this and the action now in the 9th
Circuit of appeals. See Initial Brief P. 19, In Rem P. 4-5, Response to motion for Summary ... P 14-44,
ETC.
Mrs. Tait asserts that Breinholts are raising new Claims by discussing the mis-use of the unlawful
detainer Law.

1.

Appellant's pleadings are in response an Unlawful Detainer Complaint and have been

responding to it from the onset. To allow the Plaintiff to move forward under the veil of and unlawful
Detainer action, without first establishing Standing is a violation of the Article II Constitutional Rights,
the Idaho codes and Rules of the court. These cannot be considered ne\v arguments. The very fou.'1dation
of the affirmative defenses and counter claims are based on a Lack of standing to bring this Unlawful
detainer see Appellants Initial Brief- HISTORY OF LOAN p. 2-13, 2 answers ... AFFIMATIVE
DEFENCES #1-5, Petition for In Rem hearing, etc.
C.

The Court Did abuse it's discretion on the "issue Spot" was granted.

1.

There is no evidence in record that can survive the rules of evidence that Plaintiff has standing.

Standing is a threshold issue and must be determined before the Action can proceed to a judgment.
2.

Appellants file as an informal brief and it was litigated as such.
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3.

This is a side issue and not a central issue to the arguments.

4.

1t is not Dicta as Respondents claim.

D. The evidence support the findings and further arguments are barred by Res Judicata;

E. As a matter of Law Appellant cannot raise new issues outside the right of possession of unlawful
detainer.
1.

The Threshold Procedural issue of Standing has not been established in Behalf of Deutsche

Bank to argue Res Judicata.

2.

Deutsche Bank Illegally file themselves on title to gain position of an unlawful detainer.

3.

Plaintiff has filed fraudulent documents and committed fraud and perjury to obtain the

i11rlomPnt<::
c
.

J

4.

There is not a "Final Judgment" rendered in the case CV OC 09 11351 on which to toll Res

Judicata.
5.

The com1 abused its discretion by using the Plaintiffs Statements as true. It is well documented

that Counsel has Sworn Two affidavits and multiple b1iefs and memorandums which contain omission of
fact, false statements, and perjmy. Counsel has also made numerous false statements in comt which have
been conected in the hearings. Plaintiff's counsel including the infonnation in the resultant briefs caru1ot
be relied on as true.
6.

Mrs Tait seems to be confused or deny that the federal case 1; IO CV 00466 was filed and that

she was a party to it but the docket will show that she was served with a the complaint and thereafter.
7.

The Ol\1NIBUS MOTION stated that it relies on her affidavit sweating that this case had been

dismissed while she had previously been, and currently is being served by the Idaho Supreme Court with
the ongoing case documents and docket.
8.

Furthermore, as a member of the Bar, Mrs Tait as counsel for Deutsche Bank as Trustee of the
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RAST 200S A-1 S Trust, represents to the court that the claims in the complaint are true and conect.

9.

The truth is that the alleged trust has not existed since March of 2006 and there is no evidence

before the court that the subject Note and Deed were ever in the necrotic Pooling and Servicing agreement
or that there is a legitimate claim by virtue of a securitized DOT. Appellants would have purchased the
property at the sale if it had been held; Plaintiff is not the "purchaser in good faith at the sale. Appellants
have submitted evidence otherwise.
Aegis Wholesale is the lender on the DOT. The Trustee is Transnation. All recorded assignments from
this time forward are false, fabricated documents and shown in the Initial Brief, and discussed herein.
10.

BreirL11olts believe that Deutsche Bai1k as Trustee for the RAST 5005 A-15 is attempting to

Judicially take Breinholts property in Ada County without any proof that they are the mortgagee or a
properly assignee in violation of USC Article III, Rule 17 a, 12 b ( 1).
11.

Standing is a :requirement grounded in Artide IH

or the lJnited States Constitution, :md a

defect in standing cannot hr waived by the parties. Cfw{'inuii v. Pier J Imports

1

) lnc, 6?l F.3d

939.95°1 19th Cir. 201 l L A litigant nmst have both constitutfrmai standing and prudential

JVehdo,,. 542 U.S. L ! 1 (2004). Con:-:titutional ~tanding requires the plaintiff

w "show that the condud

of which he complains has c~rnsed him to suffer an "injury in facf that a fornrabie judgment will

litigant's raising another pernm's legal rights." Id. (citation and quotation sig:nais omitted): see

also Oregon v. LRga! Scrvs. Cm7J .. 552 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2009)."
12.

"Deutsche Ba.nk Jssert.s affirrn:H1ve claims against the Bre.inhoHs seeking to enforce the

:rvro11gage and Note, and therefore must establish its legal right (i.e., standing) to do so. See, e.g.,IndyMac
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Bonk v. iHiguJ l l7 fbw. 506. 513, l84 P3d 82L
rnc)rtgagre rnusr have

13.

snffiur11t iritrrest

in thr Mortgage to lune suffered an injury from

All previous Judgments are fatally on thejr face because the court has not established standing

or held the required and requested hearing for finding of fact There is not one credible piece of paper
before the court which would establish Plaintiffs standing and Appellants have provided evidence to show
the lack there of.
14.

Breinholt's pleadings have not been heard and the court has not made any effort to listen to the

evidence to give instructions on pleading or preserve their constitutional rights of Due process.
15.

Appellants refute that the evidence supports the findings of Res Judicata. The comt has abused

its discretion in finding in favor of Res Judicata. Appellants have in detail shown the errors as follows;
"The prerequisite elements for Res Judicata are applying the doctrine to either an entire cause of action
or one or more issues are the same: (l) A claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim
or issue litigated in a p1ior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits;
and (3) the pm1y against whom the doctrine is being asse11ed was a paity or in privity with a party to the
prior proceeding. [Citations.]" (Brinton v. Bankers Pension Services, Inc. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 550,
556.)

The #1 element is not met.
( 1) A claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior

proceeding;
#1

The first case CV OC 2011 11351 was on an improper sale in the County Court. The new case

10-00466 is on.Standing as one en.titled to enforce the note/Jurisdiction. These are two separate and
different claims. The court errors in Judging them to be the same claims raised. Furthermore, this case is
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on eviction and the counterclaims. This is a new subject again.
The #2 element is not met as follows:
(2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits;

There was not a judgment rendered on which to toll same merits and different Parties are named. The
case was not litigated.
IN ORDER FOR RES JUDI CATA TO BE VALID in this case ( 2011 10414 ), the following elements
would have to been Adjudged in the 2009 113511 case:
a.

In the case C V OC 2009 11351, The Court did not establish/ fulfill the requirement of

jurisdiction, rule 12b, 17a; Who is the real party in interest?
b.

After the alleged DOT has been secmitized, is it contrary to law and recent case law that

MERS can hold and transfer beneficial interest? Are the resultant fabricated documents such as the
Notice of Default Assignment of Successor Trustee and Assignment of Trustees Deed a nullity and void?
(MERS was not a defendant in the first case)

c.

Was the alleged note and deed secmitized in the PSA?

d.

Note: When Deutsche bank came forward, as Trustee FOR THE RESIDENTIAL ASSET

SECURITIZATION TRUST 2005-A15 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2005-0 UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED
DECEMBER 1, 2005, the fact that the mortgage had been securitized was new information that had been

concealed until that time.
e.

Was The Deed of Trust and Promissory Note singed in blank, in essence making them a,

"Bearer Bond" to be placed into a Pooling and Servicing Agreement? This is an issue which was not in
the first case.
f.

Was the fact that the Mortgage documents were going to be signed in blank and placed into A
:::::::::::

;;;::::

:::

::::::c:::::::,

,::;::::
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Pooling and Servicing Agreement was concealed?
g.

Did the Securitization of the mortgage Deed of Trust render it void and no longer enforceable?

h.

ls there a recorded chain of authority for Plaintiff Et al to assign and record documents? Are

the documents generated and recorded Fraud, Perjury, and Subterfuge?
1.

ls there a viable chain of Title on which to show standing?

J.

Did One west Bank, et al, violate ICPA laws by knowingly filing a voided Deed of Trust and

note into court and arguing under that fraudulent pretense; all the time knowing that the alleged Mortgage
documents had been securitized and placed into a Pooling and servicing agreement?
k.

Are the resulting Stocks and bonds no longer governed under mortgage law but under

Secmities law and not having beneficial interest in the Breinholt's house?
l.

Is the banks' claim to be the creditor double dipping?

m.

Does a banks claim to be a creditor violate their tax exempt status?

n.

Does the claim that the Mortgage exists as a security against the house now violate the Pooling

and Servicing agreement?
o.

ls the claim that the Mortgage exists as a security against the house FRAUD, AND DOES

FRAUD VIOLATE ALL CONTRACTS AND JUDGMENTS?
p.

Has the, Plaintiff, (Pooling and Servicing agreement) been,"dis-embodied" since 3/2006? Have

the resultant Stocks and Bonds been converted to other securities and is the claim that this PSA is viable
unsupported by SEC filings and a sham?
q.

Is there credible evidence that Indymac Bank, Onewest Bank and MERS ever were the holders

of the note and therefore are the real parties in interest? Therefore, they are not the Holders of the Note?

r.

Since the Mortgage Documents were securitized is there a marketable title to be transferred?

s.

Are all previous Judgments, Ruled incorrectly because of the illusion created by Fabricated
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documents file into com1 and recorded with the County'?
t.

All of these questions were Wlknown and/or were not raised in the case on an improper Sale.

The second point of Res Judicata ls not met as shown above:

The third point of Res Judicata: (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party
or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.
a.

MERS AND DEUTSCHE BANK were not parties in the l 1351 case and are the central figures

in the fraudulent filings related to standing and securitization and fraud.
b.

Deutsche Bank is the Moving party in this case and was not a party.

The #3 standard for Res Judicata is not met as shown above.
ACTIVITY IN THIS CASE:
a.

A false and fraudulent Deed of Trnst has been filed into cow1 along with other false and

fraudulent filings. Fraud on the Court.
b.

The mortgage had been Securitized and placed into a PSA?

c.

You cannot have it both ways. ls Deutsche Bank claiming authority by virtue of the DOT or

the PSA? Neither one is valid.
d.

The alleged secmitization event would rendered the "Marketable Title" a Nullity and voided.

There was no further beneficial interest to transfer and no credible evidence to show otherwise.
e.

Any Beneficial interest, which might have remained after the Securitization, could not be

transferred to Indymac Et. Al. but belonged to the bankrnptcy trnstee for Aegis and later the FDIC as
discussed.

f.

.

.

According to MERS' record, Indymac, Onewest and MERS never hel<;l a, "marketable title"

except by their own self-serving, fabricated documents. False Statements, subterfuge and Perjury. They

INFORMAL REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL-Page 12

were done fraudulently, without any apparent authority, constituting unfair business practices, to create
the illusion of standing as discussed in previous pleadings and this brief.
1.

As documented, Breinholts did stipulate without prejudice to dismiss the case CV OC 2009

13511 concerning the fraudulent sale. MERS and Deutsche Bank were not listed in the complaint. 'The
securitization has now come to be known. There was not a Judgment made on the case, only an order to
dismiss the case. The new complaint in the United States District Court to include MERS, et al is now
before the 9th circuit of appeals. Case 12-35667. A final judgment on either case has not been rendered.
The 3 points of Res Judicata are not met by the Respondent and the Court:
Preclusion Doctrine standard

A.

The party against who the decision was asserted had full and fair opportunity to litigate the

issues.
1.

The issues were not litigated. The only document entered into the record was the Affidavit of

Counsel stating that after review of the surveillance tapes with the court deputy and the Breinholts it
showed that there was no one but Mr. Breinholt and two associates who were obviously looking for the
sale. #1 is not met.
2.

The issues decided in the prior litigation were Identical.

No issues were not litigated nor were

they argued. No Final judgment was rendered. #2 is not met.
3.

The issues sought to be precluded were actually decided in the prior litigation. No issues were

decided. #3 is not met.

4.

There was a Final Judgment rendered. There was not a Final Judgment rendered. Only a Order

of dismissal on the stipulation to dismiss. Breinholts signed a docwnent W/o prejudice but w/o their
knowledge was changed to,with prejudice. #4is not met.
5.

The issues against who the issues were asserted were the same or in privity. The case was on
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the question of a fraudulent sale and the assenions relating to it. The Federal case is on the question of
standing to hold a foreclosure. A threshold question which must be answered before a sale could be held;
not on the sale. This case is essentially the same question of standing but on the question of is Deutsche
bank as trustee to the Plaintiff/PSA a "purchaser in good faith at the sale in order to bring a unlawful
detainer action?

In this case the question of Privity is questioned more from trie stand point of

Constructive Fraud. In sho11, Breinholts and their associate went to the sale to Purchase the Prope11y but
there was not a sale. There is not a "purchaser in good faith at the sale" and no value was received. #5 is
still a question.

THE STANDARD OF PRECLUSION IS NOT MET
F.

Respondents state that there is substantial evidence supporting magistrate's findings.

1.

There is no evidence in suppo11 of the standing of Deutsche Bank.

The only evidence in record is a photo-shopped copy of the DOT and the additional fabricated
assignments.
2.
5.

These documents were created after the alleged PSA/ plaintiff suspended trade.
The record has multiple pieces of evidence which show the lack of Standing and Jurisdiction of

the coun to hear the case.
6.

Counsel does not have firsthand knowledge which the Breinholts et. Al. do. Counsel cannot

aver as to the actual truth. The Counsel's averment is hearsay. The Breinholts and the two other witnesses
have firsthand knowledge and their averment is accurate.
7.

The court abused its discretion in finding that Appellants/Defendants "fails to comply with the

Idaho Rules ... content and arrangement; that Pro se litigant are held to the same standards and rules as

.

those represented by an attorney." That the Appellant fails to denote any issues on appeal.

.

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEM (MERS):
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1.

In this case MERS lists the Min # as inactive at the time of MERS' fabiication of the

documents.
2.

There is no recorded assignment From Aegis and if there were any remaining interest it would

have belonged to the bankruptcy Trustee.

3.

The nature of the Plaintiff is a Pooling and servicing agreement which is dis-embodied. There

is not a Plaintiff.

4.

The fabricated Chain of title documents which clearly cannot stand the test of the rule of

evidence.
According to the Deed of trust,
5.

The Lender is Aegis Wholesale and by definition the Beneficiary.

6.

The Tmstee is Transnation Title.

The Deed of trust clearly instructs the Trustee, Transnation, to mail the Documents to them at 3010
BRIARPARK DRIVE, #700, HUSTON TX 77042.
There are no funher recorded assignments or transfers from either Aegis or Transnation. Whether the
Mortgage was lost at sea, or placed in some Pooling and Servicing agreement is unknown. This chain of
title is fatally broken at this point and several times more.
Aegis then filed Bankruptcy. Any remaining assets were held by Aegis' Trustee of the
bankruptcy.
There is no assignment of Trustee from Transnation to any other trustee. Transnation has since
gone out of business. Only the lender can assign a new trustee.
Three years later, (Three years after the allege Plaintiff (PSA) had finished trade and become
dis-embodied ·according to the SEC filings and Exhibit #12 l\.1ER.s' records, (in record evidence))
Breinholts applied for a loan modification and we immediately see the fabrication of documents
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attempting to create a chain of title, without any knowledge or authority to do so.

At the time the

documents were filed the FDIC would have held any remaining assets of Indymac and the assignments
were then made to Onewest which had not yet been formed. The modification was approved. Indymac
(Onewest) bank never sent the loan package. MERS' Min# shows inactive which means that no member
of MERS held title at this point of time that the transfers were being fabricated.

17ie Mirage Colkd "MERS:"
The Ap_I:ellees state that Mortgage Electmnic Registration S~tems, Inc. (Hereinafter MERSinc) is a settled area of law.
However, ~ants state that the only thing settled a.rout this area oflaw is the mass of confusion. The ~ants have identified
the mot cause is that the Parties and Courts identify two dift'erent ColJX)Ialions by the same Acronym, e.g., "MERS."
The same thing happ:i1s in families where a parent and child have the same given name. fur example if a Father is runned

John and the son is named John soon everyone in the family is frustrated by always asking others which John are they are talking
alx)Ut

In the r,;1se of MERSCORP, Inc. and it,;; sl.lbsidiary MERS Inc., it was obviously planned to have the aounym be exactly the
same. RhetoriGllly why would they do this? Appelhmt,;; claim it wa,;; done to blur the distinction between MERSCORP, Inc. and
~1ERS Inc. This c<mfu.;;ion causes the rnnsmners, land ia.:01ds and comts to believe they are really the same when they are
difl'erent For and on the record, MERSCORP INC IS NOT NAMED ON THE DEED OF TRUST AND IS NOT

AUTHORIZED TO ACTIN BEHALF OF THE IENDERIBENIFIOARY.
Shouldn't the court and parties immediately recognize this? The key infonnation that the Appellants discoveim that brings

this to light is that NIERSORP, Inc. has a system with "Members" governed by Membership Rules
Comprre this to the wording on page 1of Ap_I:ellant' s Deed of Trust. See Exhibit #1

(E) "MERS" is Mongage Electronic RegistraJion Systems, Inc: MFRS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a
nominee for Lender.and lenders successors and assigns. MERS is the benefidary W1der this Secwity Instnonent, MERS is
organized and existing wuler the laws ofDelaware
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Now in MERSCORP,lnc. Memtership Rules -Rule 1Section 1 of Rules states:

RVIE 1 MEMBERSJHP Seaion 1. MERSCORP, Inc. ("MFRS") shall make the services of its mongage electronic
registration system (the "MERS® System") available to any Mernber ofMERS. A Member is defined as an organiWJion or
natural person who has signed a Membership Agreement and is not more than «J days pa5t due a5 to the payment ofanyfees due
and owing to MERS.
Evay mention of MERS in the Rules nml.s to re replaced by the definition for MERS "MERSORP, Inc" to tmderstand the

entity l:x:ing referred thereto.
The MERSCORP, lNC. RUIES OF MEMBERSJHP show that: in the Rules the acronym MERS stands for MERSCORP,

Inc (Rule I); MERSCORP, Inc. has a Memrership System called the mortgage electronic registration system or MERS® System
(Rule 1); MERSCORP, Inc has meml:x:rs who pay t'res to it (Rule 1, Rule 5); MERSCORP, Inc has a romputer system with a
data base U9:d by its memters (Rule 2); t½e ~/IEPSCORP, lnc ~.1ember decides 'vvI'en m1d hovv to conduct forccloStu~ rut
MERS Inc (Rule 8); MERSCORP, Inc has no ownership rights whatsoever to any information contained in the MERS® System

(Rule 9); Note that MERSCORP, 1nc has employees (Rule 12). However, MERS Inc. ha,;; no Meml:ers, receives no memtership

tees. has; no cumputers or database (All Rules). But MERSCORP, Inc. gives itself the acronym l\1ER.S to confuse lxmowers,
litigant'~ and the COllit<;.
Pleadings after pleadings and cornt decision after court decision use the MERS acmnym for ooth CX)IJX)icttions and quickly
bxome unintelligibie. The cornts apparently think they are retening to the same thing but they aren't Becat1se of the atove
clarification regarding MERSinc and JVIERSCORP, hlc. the Appellees use of Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.

656 F.3d 1034 (<I' Cir. 21Jl1) (Cervantes) as a precedent is misplaced and should re ignore:i
Looking at Cervantes on page 5 in tl1e judges oµning statement: "Thi'> is a putative clas.s action challenging originalion and

foreclosure procedures for home loans maintained within the Mortgage Electronic Registrarion System (MERS). "
The court has now defined the ammym MERS to refer to the m01tgage electronic registration system (the' 'MERSORP, Inc

System' 'XSee Section 1 quote aoove). TI1e couit has now defined :MERS to represent a totally differently COIJX)ration than the one
on the 00T in this case, which means f'..ervantes can't arply to this case. l,Wzy would the cowt define the very same aavnymjor
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a dijferenl co17JOrarion rhan on rhe IXJT and thus en1er massive confi1sion in10 the case? Aprellants Wieve that it was l:x:cause the
Comt lacked the MERSCORP, Inc Memtership Rules which would have made it clear that multiple entities were using the same
aaonym.

It gets worse. On page 6 of the Cetvantes decision it states: '"The tc,cus of this lawsuit-and many others arotmd the
muntry-is the MERS system. 1. How MERS works ..."

Later in that same pardgfaph the comt rete1s to another case in Minnerota stating,

''Many ofthe companies that pm1icipate in the mortgage industry--by 01iginaring loans, buying or investing in the benefidal
interest in loans, or servicing loans--are members ofMERS and pay a fee to use the tracking system See Jackson v. Mortg.
Blee. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N. W2d 487, 490 (Minn. 20()')) (Jackson)."
Bui MERSJnc has no members, so the confi,sion ino-eases. Ihe Jackson case defines MERS as the defendant, Mortgage
Electronic Regis1ralion Systems, Inc (lv[ERS). '''
Then in the next paragraph of the Jackson decision states:

MERS does nor originaJe, lend service, or invest in home mo11gage !own~ Jmreatl, MERS acts as the mminal rn011gagee
fix the loans owne_d by its members. Ihe l'v!ERS system i-s designed to allow it.5 members, which include miginmors, lenders,
service,:<;, and inve.'i10rs, to a1sign home mcmgage loans without having to record each tr~fer in the local land recording offices
where the real estate securing the rno11gage is located MERS members pay subscriberfee;; to register on the ME-1?5 system, as
well as otherfees on each loan regiwered and each tramaaion conducted
The fust part of the fust sentence in the atove quote refers to !VIERS as the m01tgagee and is reterring to MERS Inc, but the

second p:mion of the first sentence and the sa.:ond sentence reter to MERS memters and only MERSCORP, Inc has members.

The next two references to MERS are al9-) to MERSCORP, Inc not to MER.Slnc. In toth the CeivJntes and Jaclcrm cases the
same MERS acmnym is often used for two diflerent entities in the same µrragraph sometimes in the same sentence. All of the

cases Appellees refer to about MERS have thisMERS acmnym ronfusion.
How can the Cervantes decision have force on the present case when the docwnents submitted to the cowt by the
Appellants in this case ,ww clearly show the flaw in the multiple uses ofa single acronym to refer to multiple entities 011d
confuse any wulerstanding ofthese separate entities?
The two deµ)sitions that help remove the amfusion and get clown to what does MERS Inc actually have and actually do: 'The
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Dqnsition of RX. Arnold on Septemcer 25, 200.:,, and the Dep)sition <)f William Hultman taken on April 7, 20 I0, toth officers
of MERS Inc. See Declaration of Sterling Mortensen in SUJJIXllt of Motion to take Judicial Notice Attachment

1 and 2 ~

anxhed to DKT 19, see full references to court cases of the depo~ition<; on pg 27 and 28 of Ap:rellant' s initial brief). ~llants
had reteired to each of these deJX)Sitions in their tu Amended Complaint Factual Allegations 3.50.

As shown in the AJJrellants op:nmg brief the atove ret001Ced deposition<; show that NIERSCORP, Inc. officers and officers

of MERS Inc declare that MERS Inc: has no employees; has no entitlement to money paid under any note; has no l::xnefidal
in~1 in any Note; it does not make loans; it has no 1ight to sell a Note and cannot re:eive value or consideration to sell a note; it
has no mt-hand knowledge as to whether a torrower is delinquent on a Note; MERSCORP mernrers not MERSinc decide

when to foreclose. (See pg 28 in Apj:dlants Initial Brief for pages in deJx)sitions that state these facts.)

TIU! Phantom 1viERS Agent:
Can MERS Inc act as an agent? Agents act as servants to masters. In the oor in the present case it states that MERS Inc is a
nominee of the Lender, it i<; ~ listed as the Beneficiary although it i<; not the Lender, toth of these imply that it act<; a<; an agent tor
the Lender. The Rules and officer dqx)sitions show that MERSinc has no employees, has no a<;sers, has no income and pays no
money to anyone else. So MERSinc can't receive crnrespondence from the party having lxne:ficial interest, can't take actions like
oeating cb:::uments or paying filing fees, cm 't ~ documents to recon:lers offices. So there are no actions in the present case that
were taken by MERSinc.
In Moss v. Vadman, 77 Wash2d 396, 402--03, 463 P.2d 159 (1970) (MOSS) it was observed that "[w]e have re:reatedly
held that a prerequisite of an agency is control of the agent by the principal." Id. at 402,463 P.2d 159. A Principal cm't control
MERS Inc l:ffause there is no one to coirespond with and no one to take actions. It is in fact impossible for MERSinc to fulfill a
mle as an agent Aro, the MOSS case shows that even with documents claiming an agent relationship if there aren't signatures of
the principle and the agent showing their agreement then there is no agent 1elationship. This matches with lC. 9-5"ffi which states
that certain agreements must be.in writing and subscribed. A torrower cm't m~ate an agent relationship between two companies;
the cornµmies must sign to be binding. The oor has no signatures by MERSinc, the Lender, all succesrors and assigns ~ there
«:::m:::::::::::::::

:::::::::
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is no binding poof of any principles or any agent.

IDAHO TRUST DEED ACT (IIDA):
Next are the violations of the Idaho Trust Deed Act,ldaho Code TI1le45 Chapter 15. LC.

45-1502. Definitions Trustee's charge. As used in this act:
(1) "Beneficimy" means the person named or othenvise designated in a trust deed as the person for whose benefit a tnlSi
deed is given, or his successor in interest, and who shall not be the tmsree.
(3) 'Tmst deed" means a deed executed in confrmnity tvith thi.s act and conveying real property to a mmee in tmst to secure
the performance ofan obligation ofthe grantor or other person named in the deed to a beneficimy.
(4) 'Trustee" me011s a person to whom the legal title to real property is conveyed by In/St deed, or his successor in interest
The definition in item (4) that a JXTSOl1 who is given legal title is a Trustee. In the Apµillants OOf it states: "Borrower

tmderstands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title" (page 2 OOf), by the definitions in LC. § 45-1502 MERSinc is a
tmstee. ll1e Legislature i-; extnmely sp:eific in its wording that iflegal title is transferred to an entity that entity is called a trustee.
Earlier on Page 2 of the App:;llants DOT it states 'The beneficiary of this Security Instrument is MERS" this statemrnt says
1\1ERSinc is the beneficiary but now it is both a trustee and a beneficiary but LC.§ 45-1502(1) states that the berieficiaiy cannot
1::e the trustee. The definitions me clear if you get legal title you are a Trustee and you can't be a berieficimy.
Definition LC.§ 45-1502(3) states a 'Trnst deed" means a deed executed in confomuty with this act How can the DOT
written by Cotmtrywide possibly be in confo1mance with this act when there are two tmstees and one of was made the beriefidmy
which is strictly 101.bidden by (1)! The document is not written in conformity to the IIDA and theret01e it is not a valid Trust Deed

as according to LC. § 45-1502(3). This was explained in ApreJlants pleadings but the Idaho District Comt misused its discretion
and never addressed this po1tion of Apre}lants' claims.

APPLICABLE LAWS -On page 3 of the ApreJ!ants OOf in Definitions it states:
(j) "Applicable LJJW" means all controlling applicable federal, state and local statutes, regulations, ordinances and
administrative rules {01[f orders (that have the effect oflaw) as well as all applicablefinal, non-appealable opiniom:

It can be seen from the aoove'quote that the applicable law for this DOT is all controlling federal, state and local statures,

regulations, ordinances and admn:ristrarive rules. 1HE FAJR DEBT COILECTION PRACTICES ACT (FDCPA) is
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clearly applicable; ~ince the Note and OOT me toth negotiable lll')t:nrrnent') the Idaho Title 28 is al9J a controlling statue and the
laws of agency are al9J applicable. The ISC decisions in Trotter and Edwards and the Ninth Cirnrit Courts decision in

Cervantes didn't amsider all Applicable law as required in this OOI.
TIIEFAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (FDCPA):
§ 809. Validation ofdebts [15 USC§ 1692g] (a) VVithinjive days after the initial, communimtion with a consumer in
connection ¼ith the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall unless the follo1,,ving infonna!ion is contained in the initial,

communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a iwitten notice containing - (1) the amount ofthe debt; (2)
the name ofthe a-editor to whom the debt is owed;
The Appellants requested through multiple letters the runne of the actual Creditor for the Note, the Person Entitled to Enforce
the Note. Thenon-resµ:mdingviolated 1692g(a).
This is J1so a clear example of not 1esp:>nding to a RESPA written request. Tne failure to resp:md to the ietter is ai9J a
violation of the Federal Corresp;mdence Act

DEC'h¥TIVE PRACTICES, FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS:
§812. Fumishingcertaindeceptivefonns [15 USC 169.?j]
(a) It i5 unkmful to deYign, compile, andfamish anyjv,m h1owing that such jv,m would be w;ed ro create the false beliefin a
consumer that a person other than the a-editor ofsuch consumer is 1x1rtici1x11ing in the collection ofor in an attempt to collect a
debt such consumer allegedly owe5 such aeditm; when infact such person is nor so panicipating.

15 USC 1692j(a) was violated by the As.signment of OOf (See Exhibit #3, :t,:1 Amended Complaint). MERSinc can't take
actions 9J didn't participate in the Assignment The Assigmnent of the OOI says MERSinc received consideration but testimony
of its officers say it can't receive considerdt:ion, 9J it didn't participate again. See Supra.
The FIXJ>A § 807, under False or misleading representations 15 USC 169),._e(2Xa) was violated becanse ~limits have
never received a proper Default Notice from the Lender(PersonEntitled to Enforce the Note) as srecified in theDOf.
The FIXJ>A § 807 15 USC 1692e(5) and § 807 15 USC 1692e(l 4) were violated because a non-beneficiaiy created and
filed the Assigmnent providing a false name and the actual Minit-x=r of the MERSCORP, Inc system wasn't listed on the OOI 9J
had no legal right to file the doa.nnent.
::

: :::

:::::::o:::::

,o,;,o,:,.e«,i::::::::m::
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The FOCPA § 807 15 USC l 692e(6)(A&B) were violated Vvith the false representation that a real agent had actually made a

valid assignment of the oor and Note when it hadn't
The FOCPA § 80715 USC 1692e(l 0) was violated 1:x:cause the OOT had a premeditated plan by listing a non-agent as an

agent and planning to hide NIERSCORP, me Memters identities with false representation-; and deceptive means.
§ 808. Unfair practices [15 USC§ 1692f]

(6) Tafdng or threatening to take any nonjUilicial action to effect dispos<:;ession or disablement ofproperty if(A) there is no present 1igh1 to possession ofthe property claimed a<:; collateral, through an eriforceable sernrity interest; See
Meyer attachffl and l!Jfrg_.
The FOCPA § 80715 USC 1692e(9) was violated 1:x:cause Appellants took nortjudicial action when the Person Entitled to

Enton::e the Note according to Idaho Title 28 had never teen identififfl and there was deception by the Appellants on the DOT and
Assignment document for parties who had no right to JX)SSeSsion of the proµny.
The next applicable law to the 00T i-; Idaho Title 28 as there is a negotiable instrument involved. The REPORT OF 111£

PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMEROAL CODE APPUCA170N OF 11JE
UNIFORM COilfMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES REIA17NG TO MORJGAGE NOTES' dated
NOVEMBER 14, 2011 (Hereafter reteired

to

as "PEB UCC Rqx]t")) The UCC Article 3 covers enforcing obligations and

Article 9 covers traru,ters of Note mvne:rship and recon::ling assignment<; in the recorder's office. . ..parties may not avoid the
application of UCC Article 9 to a tran5action that falls within its scope. See id., and Official Comment 2 to UCC § 9-100.
The filing in the recorder's office of an assignment comes from LC.§ 28-9-607 Collection and entorcement by secured party.

(a) Jfso agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party:
(b) Ifnecessary to enable a secured party to exercise, Wider subsection (aX3) ofthis section, the righl ofa debtor to enforce a
mortgage nonjudicially, the secured party may record in the office in which a record ofthe mortgage is recorded:
(1)
A copy ofthe secwity agreement that create'i or provides for a security interest in the obligation secured by
the mongage;
The PEB UCC REPORT on µige 9 explains the steps to transfer ownership of anote. For Idaho this is governed by LC. §

28-9-203. Attachment and enfon::eability of sea.uity interest:
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(b) ... a secUJity in1erest is eriforceable against the debtor and third JXJJ1ies 1+ith re:,,pect to the collateral only if
(1) Value has been given;

(2) The debtor has righls in the collateral or the JXJWer to transfer 1ights in the collaJeral to a sewredpany; and

A transfer cmly happ:ns if value is given and the rerson selling the security interest has rights to the pmr,erty.
The PEB UCC Rep:)rt on page 9, first paragraphs '"for pm]X)ses of Article 9, the buyer of a pmrnis..~ry note is a "secured

party" that has acquirro a "security interest'' in the note." Thus we see that in cm:ler to n:eord sea:nity interest for a noryudicial
mortgage the secured party who has rough! the note has to nmrd the sec1llity agreement that shows a transfer in a security interest.

FRAUDULENT NOTARIZATION AND VOID DEED
Idaho Statutes as well as Idaho Courts agree that Notaries Public rnlli1 confonn their conduct to a defined statutory duty of
care which requires, first. that the~ whose signature is l:ring acknowledged have o.ppeoJed before the notary to executed the
instnnnent, and, second, that the notary must either have known the ~ n whose signarure is being acknowledged or the notary
mU5t have had satisfactory evidence that the rerson acknowledging was the J.XTI(ID descriced in the instnrrnent and was the i:erson
who executed the instrnment See Cf Gty Omswner Services, Inc. v. lvletadf, 775 P.2d 10:>5 ( 1989).
Thus, Notaries are required to 1) oc in the physical p1esence of the person who is signing the d0etrrnent ancVor 2) know the
JX'.IS)n r:erronally or have satisfoc1o:iy evidence pmving the p:Tion's identity. In the case cited aoove, the court fotmd that the
Notny Public was negligent in teing present when the ckx::mnenl was ::.igned and allowing a signatme without proof of
identification.
Under the UCC (Unit01m Commercial Code) dOCtnnents; involving real estate (including docmnents needed forforeclosme)
are refened to as "1ealty pareJ''. See Cf Rodney v. Arizona Bank, 836 P.2d 434 (1992). The UCC is not kind to those who
commit fraud with ''realty parer". UndertheUCC those guilty of fraud cannot enforce theinights to a contract and can lose their
rights to foreclose, or in this case, Apµ:ilants had a fraudulent Assigmnent filed after the Notary Public signed with an 6-<lays

di:fterence in the signature and notary dates.
Aprellants have pointed out mnnerous examples of false signature on the qualifying doannents recordfrl by resp:mdents in

INFORMAL REPLX,,BRIEF ON APPEAL-Page 23

the Affirmative defenses and counJer Claims and in the In Rem pleadings which were never hemd.
In United States Of America-Vs-Bank Of America, NA., Bae Home Loans Servicing, LP; ilimtrywide ~

FSB, Et AL, l:12-Bk-00361-RMC, District Of Cohnnbia, the Comt held that mnnerous Banks and Lending
organizations/institutes, as well as actions of thml µrrty providers, mmmitted numerous willful and knowing fraudulent acts
relating to false and deceptive preparation and u& of affidavits and other documents, ie., Deeds. The Order s'i.ates, in pai-t, that the
defendants are sanctioned for violating,

2. As desaibed in the allegations below, Dtft-ndants' miscondua resulted in the issuance ofilnproper mJ11gages, premature
and unauthorizedforeclosures, violation ofservice members' and other homeowners' rights and protecn·ons, the use offalse mu/
deceptive affidavits and other documents. (Emphasis added).
In another relevant case from the Washington Supreme Comt, Klem vs. Washington Mutual Bank, et al., No. 'if7105-1,
Washington Supreme Cotm:, Febrnary 28,2013, Slip Opinion at 23, the Cotm: held that Resp::mdent,

.. .suggests these falsely notarized doaunents are imma1e,ial because the owner received the minimum notice required by
law. 1his no-harm, nojiJul argument again reveals a misunderstanding of Washington law and the pwpose and im;xmance of
the normv'., mh1owledgmen1 under the law. A signed 1wtarizPJinn is the u]Jimate asswwu:e upon which the wlwle world is
entitled to rely that. the proper person signed a docwnent on the stated day and place. Local, interstate, and intemationnl
trm1Slldions involving i:ndi:viduals, banks, mu/ co,poratwns proceed smoothly because all may rely upon the sanctity ofthe
notary's seal This cowt does not take lighJJ,y the importance ofa notmy's obligation to verify the sig,wr's identity and the date
ofsigning by having the signature perfonned in. the notmy's presence. Wemer v. Wemer, 84 Wn2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974)

(Emphasis Mded).
The Klem com1 went on to state that.

A notmyjuraJ is a public oust and all.owing them to be deployed to validate false i:n.fonnatwn strikes at the bedrock ofowsystem. We note that Washington state asserts aiminaljurisdiction over any person "who commits in the state any aime, in whole
or in pmr'' or "cornrrnts an act vvithout the state which affects persons or property within the srate, which, ifcornrrntted within the
stale, would be a aime, "among many other things. RCW 9A 04.030(, I) (5). (Emphasis Mded)

TIIE NINE POIN1S OF FRAUD AS APPLIED TO APPELLEES:
The AJ)f,cllees have been involved in committing fraud on the Aprellants, on the recorrler' s office and on the comts. They

have been making willful misreprerentations.

The nine points ofFraud are now listed for the DOT in tl1i5 present~=
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l.

Representation: Aegis Wholesale/Transnation/MERS et al (Resp:mdents) willfully misrepresented on the DOT that

:MERSJnc had the capability to act as an agent and that the DOT confo1med to LC. § 45-1502 See Supra.
Its falsity: The Phantom "MERS Agent section earlier showed that MERSJnc couldn't take any actions as an agent.

2.

The oor filed by Resp:mdents does not follow the definitions of LC. § 45-1502. No signatures means no agent relationships and

FDCPA violations See Supra.

3.

Its materiality: IfMERSlnc isn't areal agent ancVor the DOT doesn't confoim to the IIDA then the DOT is Fraud.

4.

SJ:X:akers knowlec4:,-.e of falsity: Respmdents knew that MERSlnc couldn't act as an agent MERSlnc. didn't sign

the DOT, R~ndents didn't sign it and all future succesrors and assigns didn't sign it so there is no agent relationships created.
Respmdents knew it was doing this so that parties would do actions later hiding tehind MERSlnc' s name lxx::ause it was
follovv1ing ~/IERSCOPJ), Inc. instructions in Rule 2 sec1ion 5 and theretOre kre\v iJ"Je Ruks. RQµ_J1idents knew it was violating
the IIDA definitions and did not disclose MERSCORP, Inc. or the MERSCORP, Jnc Member system. The IDPC:A violations
were also known by ResJXmdents. See S@ra for detailed explanations on all violations. The DOT violates lC. 48-603 (12)
obtaining the signatwe of the buyer to a amOctL't when it contains blank spaces to be filled in after it has been signed Essentially,
the oor had blank spaces where the Members paying money to MFRSCORP, Inc. claim to add themselves to be the named
Beneficiaiy without the Ap~ants knowing in advance that this deceptive practice is taking place. (See Ct~ Slip Opinion, In re

Meyer, et al v. US.BAJ\!]( N..A.etal., Case No. 10-2.3914, Adv. No.12-01630, United States Bankr. Cl, WD. Washingtoo,
Seattle,Februmy 18, 2014-Exhlbit-A, page 5, paragraphs 2 & 3, page 6, paragraphs 1,2, & 3, page 11,paragraph 3, page 12, all 5
paragraphs, page 13, first p-<lmgraph, hereto) DOT violates J.C. 48-603(3) causing misunderstanding as to affiliation, COlll1e(,'tion.

or association lxx::ause MERSlnc mnnectim<; or associations with MER.'>CORP, Jnc and its members me not disclosed lC. 48-

(,()3(2) and LC. 48-(,()3(17) engaging in any act or practice which is otherwise misleading, false, or deceptive to the consumer; is

demonstratoo by the plan tor other entities to falsely use the runne ofMER.'>lnc.
5.

.

The speaker's intent that it be acted uixm by the recipient in the marmer reasonably mnternplated: Resp:mdents

intended that the Appellants, the nrorder' s office and the murts would aa:ept that l\llERSinc was a valid agent and 1:x:nefi.ciary
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and that it would l::e listed as the teneficimy in the recon:iers index system. Respondents did not disclose MESCORP, Inc or its
Memlx:rs and that they would deceptively use the name ofMERSlnc to hide their identity.
The hearers were ignorant of the of the fact that MERSlnc coulcln't act as an agent and that there was a Scheme by

6.

the t:mdisclosed MERSCORP, Inc and its Memlx:rs which encourage entities not named on the OOT to deceptively create and
file docrnnents lillder the name ofMERSlnc. The court case documents mentioned eai'iier are filled with references to MERS and
obviously think that l\1ERSlnc is a self-op:rating agent with employees and money to take actions and that it has on its own taken
actions. The comts also clearly l::elieve that the only entity using the aaunym MERS is MERSlnc and never refer to the fact that in

the MERSCORP, Inc. Meml::ership system uses acronym MERS to refer to MERSCORP, Inc. MERSCORP, Inc. and its
memlx:rs were not disclosed on the oor and have no authority to take actions with regards to the oor.

different Beneficimy than the Lender was legal and that it was an op:rating agent that did wOik for Respmdents. The recorder's
office recon:led the OOT and l::elieved that a valid Beneficimy had beer1 named and that it was written in conformance to the

TIDA and indexed the ckx.rnnent with MERSlnc as the l::eneficimy. The Idaho District COUit l::elieved MERSinc was a valid
agent and accepted it on the oor as an agent in its decision and relied on the oor to l::e written in conformance to the TIDA.
Apµ:llants signed the DOT. See Meyer attadled and atove, and Supra.
The A.pp:llants had tl-ie right

b.

to

expect Resµmdent~ to represent true facts on the

oor mid was written it in

a:mforrnance with the IIDA. The ApJ:rllants had the 1ight to exp:ct Respondents to give full disclosure as required on all
oontracts and that lillrnilled parties would not have any JX)Wer to act with the OOT. The recorder's office and cornts had the right
to exµ:ct the 00T doclill.Ient to l::e true and in conformance with the IIDA and that full disclosure had taken place since the

document would l::e considered self-authenticating, and they had the right to assume that no praneditated plan of deception had
teen included in the OOT. See Meyer attached and atove, and Supra.

Injuries caused by Resp:mdents and the other ~ees:

7.
a

~ees attempted a wrongful fora::losure on Apjrllants pmJ:ertY with the intent of urtjust emichment The Idaho
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State Comt and the Jdaho District Comt dischm-ged the App::llants Oanns but they wouldn't have allowed a a nonjudicial foreclosure if the hidden parties had used their 0\\111 names in filing the Assignment document and mt falsely
used the name ofMERSinc.
b. App::llees violated the Fair Debt and Collaiions Protection Act. See Meyer attachcrl and alxwe, and Supra.

c. Appellees violated App:1lant,;; rights under Idaho Title 28 by not following the law on negotiable iru,truments which
would have protected Appellants prop::rty rights. See Meyer attached and arove, and Supra.
d. App::llees have not answered Appellants coIIeSJX)I]dence to identify the hidden parties involved in a violation of

Federal Coorsµ)ndence Act. Appellants nro:led this information to exrose the other parties' actions to the corn1 by
adding them to the lawsuit and showing how their actions damaged the AJ)fellants. They have thus pllIJX)Scly delayed
the court prcx:ess a.Tld tried to riide guilty parties and liITiited AJ)i'cllants from betting damages from these hidden paities.

e. It caused App::llants hundreds of hours of wmk over several years to discover the web of seaK)' and confusion
created by m,ing a common ac1nnym for an entity not disclosed on the OOT and Appe1lees have hidden their scheme
by using false 11.nnes on the assignment doctnnent.
f.

App::llees caused intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distn:ss contributing
to cancer in Appellant Richard and Susan Breinholt by possibly losing their pmrezty to hidden parties who don't have
rights thmugh the scheme of deception. See Meyer attached and atove, u1 id Supra.

1be nine JX)ints ofFraud are now listed for the ~ n t ofOOT in this present case:
1.

Representation is made that l\11ERSinc sold its interest in the note to Indymac Bank, et al., making it the new secured

party. See Ex #3

2.

Its falsity: From the deJX)sitions IvlERSinc never buys a note nor has any interest in a note, it can't sell a note and

can't receive consideration for selling a note See, Supra. Thus Indymac didn't become a secured party cecause MERSinc has no
ownership of the note and can never receive consideration or value, it violates LC.,§ 'lS-9-flJ'J an invalid security transfer

.

docrnnent and LC. § '18-9-203 no value received and not from a party who can transfer its interest in the note. No consideration no
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transfer. MERSinc never creates docrnnents so this docrnnent was not made by it SEE, Supra. The notarization was invalid. See

Chain of title anyq]isi<;- Affimafive defences cmd Coimter Cl£ams,

zid amended complaint, Motion

for In Rem hea1ing to

verify....Show cause.

Its materiality: If the docmnent was not valid a nonjudicial foreclosme cannot le done.

3.

Speakers knowledge of falsity: BACHLS knew that MERSlnc was not the secured patty on the note and that no

value or consideration was given to it and that it didn't create this document and that hidden parties are involved violating FDCPA
StXt:ions 15 USC § l 692e(2)(A)(6) 'The false representation or implicatioo that a sale, referral, or other transfer of any interest in a
debt'', 15 USC § 1692e(9) was violated 1:x:cause the real entity creating the Assignment da:mnent uses another entities runne

causing a false impression as to its source, 15 USC§ 1692e (14) was violated - use of any business, compa11y, or organization
rnme other thmi the true 11.ame of the debt collectors bt.L<iness, company, or orgai,ization. Apj:ellees knew that :MERSinc wasn't a
valid agent that rould take actioos and yet made representations that it had taken actioos which are physically impossible. See
Supra

4.

The sreaJ<_ers intent that it be aL1ed upon by the recipient in the manner reasonably rontemplated: The Resµmdent

wanted the App:;llant<;, recorder's office and romts to accept thi5 docrnnent as a valid docrnnent and a self.authenticating
docrnnent to proceed with a nonjudicial foredosme.
5.

Hearer's ignorance of its falsity: The 1c·corder's office was ignorant of ti'1e falsity and filed the docmnent as an

assignment The Idaho District Cornt was ignorant of its falsity as demonstrated by their decision. A~llants were ignonmt of the
Falsities at signing, of the roncealments and omissioos and failmes to disclose.
6.

Heme.r's reliance oo its truth

The rerorder's office filed the docmnent as an assignment fiDrn MERSinc to

INDYMAC. The Idaho ~irict Court relied on its truth as demoostrated by their decision. ~ants relied oo its 1mth until they

regan investigating the parties.
7.

The right to rely - The document was filed as a self-authenticating document which the recorder's office, courts and

Ap~ants had a right to rely oo it as trufu.

f ,

I

~
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8.

His ~uent and proximate injmy - Aprellants include all the iryuries shovvn mm section 9 of the 9 JX)ints of

fraud for the oor in this section for the Assignment of the oor. App::llants were al.9J dam3eoed by Aprrl}ees' instmctions that
App::llants had to miss payments in order to qualify for the Horne Affordable Modification Pmgram (HAMP) which was a direct
violation oflS USC § 1639(1) which hold that no servicer or loan holding cm "Recommend Default"1 and MERSCORP, Inc.
There is no credible evidence to support the claims and judgments in favor of the Plaintiff.

G.

Is Deutsche Bank a purchaser in good faith?

Although the complaint against the alleged sale was stipulated dismissed, Appellants and two other
witnesses were at the location of the sale at the time it was to be held to cure the alleged default.
Breinholts are not herein trying to litigate a wrongful sale (case 11351) as follows but stating facts as
they are.
If the opportunity to be a purchaser in good faith had been presented, The Breinholts and their
investors would have purchased it at the alleged sale. Neither, Breinholts or Deutsche Bank were
presented an opportunity to purchase as there was not a sale held. If the opportunity to purchase the
property at the sale had been presented Deutsche Bank would not have been the purchaser in good faith:
The Breinholts would have been.
Deutsche Banks claim to have purchased the properly at the sale is purgery. The alleged Purchase at
the sale in good faith is in violation of UCC 3-104, 201, 203, 301 (Endorsement's, negotiations,
Enforcement, Transfers, Right to cure) and IC 45-1506(5)(6)(7)(8)(10)(] 1), (Right to purchase at the Sale
at the time and Place advertised, proper recordation of valid title, )
The Breinholts and the 2 witnessed, have knowledge of the non-sale and dispute that the sale was held
in accordance to IC @45-1506. These are facts are supported by evidence of the surveillance tapes of the
sale location at the time of the sale.
The chain of title is fatally flawed multiple times before the alleged sale was held. Therefore, even if
1

The Appellants stand on their argument in the initial Brief on Appeal for the other arguments raised therein.
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there had been a sale it was a nullity.
Deutsche Bank had foreknowledge of the Defects and of the fabricated title as they were the original
Trustee of the alleged PSA Securitization process in 2005. IC 45-1505
3.

They knew that they were not at the alleged sale. lC45-1506(8)

4.

As the Trustee of the original PSA, they also knew the alleged Trustee of the sale never had a

marketable title to bring to the sale. IC 45-1505
5.

They knew that there was not a sale for the Trustee to accept a bid at. 45-1506(8)

1.

They knew that there was not a Trustee at the sale to accept a good faith payment.45-1506(9)

2.

In violation to JC 45-1506A and the Lis Pends, Deutsche Bank illegally recorded themselves

on title so as to now proceed with this unlawful detainer.
3.

Respondent Claims they are entitled to possession as purchaser at the sale.

It is clear that Deutsche Bank is not a valid title holder of a note or DOT and does not have standing as

a purchaser in good faith. A filed assignment of title is not valid. Such a claim is clearly disputed.
Deutsche Bank is not entitled to an order of ejectment until the court holds a hearing to determine the
threshold question of standing and the court's Jmisdiction to hear the claims of the Respondent the
Judgments are on their face.
The standing of Deutsche Bank as a purchaser in good faith is unsupported and is disputed.
ST ANDING HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED: The court has abused its discretion as follows;
H.

Respondents claim that Breinholts never challenged the Motion for summary Judgment and

had plenty of time for a hearing.
Breinholts have scheduled a hearing.for Rule to Show Cau.se however the court, on its own initiative,
changed to a hearing on res Judicata at the hearing.
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Breinholts did file Affirnrntive answers and counterclaims to the original complaint.

Plaintiff

Defaulted and Breinholts filed numerous motion for default and for hearings to show cause and for
Judgments which the court ignored. After all of the default pleadings were not heard, Plaintiff filed for an
expedited summary Judgment WffH OUT RESPONDING TO THE DEFENCES AND Counterclaims.
Breinholts file the response to the Motion for summary Judgment Titled "Verified Petition for In Rem
Action to Validate Plaintiffs Interest and Standing to file a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction"
which the court again refused to hear.

Plaintiff did eventually file a response to the defences and

counterclaims.
The court, again, has Ignored the Counter Claims, and the Default and then heard the Expedited
Summary Judgment Motion. The court has shown prejudice by not allowing the Breinholts pleading to be
heard while at the same time hearing the Plaintiffs motions. See Court docket @6-3-12, Thru 12-1-2011.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO HEAR IN REM ACTION
REGARDING PROPERTY DISPUTES

The Fou11eenth Amendment declares that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
prope11y, without due process of law." This prohibition has regard not to matters of form, but to substance
of right. Since its adoption, whatever was the rule before, a non-resident pany against whom a personal
action is instituted in a state court without service of process upon him may, if he please, ignore the
proceeding as wholly ineffective, and set up its invalidity if and when an attempt is made to take his
propeny thereunder, or when he issued upon it in the same or another jurisdiction. Western Life Indem.
Co. v. Rupp (1914), 235 U.S. 261,273, 35 S. Ct. 37, 40-41, 59 L. Ed. 220,224 (emphases added) (citing
Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U.S. 714, 732-33, 24 L. Ed. 565,572) (overruled on other grounds by Shaffer
v. Heitner (1977), 433 U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683).
Whether the Court has jurisdiction over this case is a question of Constitutional Law and must be
addressed immediately upon demand by the Appellant. See CBM Collections, Inc., Id. at 212.
The issue of standing involves both "constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and
prudential limitations on its exercise." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d
343 ( 1915). Constitutional standing concerns whether the plaintiff's personal stake in the lawsuit is
sufficient to have a "case or controversy" to which the federal judicial power may extend under the
,,

.

,,,,~
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Constitution's Article Ill. Id. at 498-99; Pershing Park Villas, 219 F.3d at 899; Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992).
Additionally, the prudential doctrine of standing "is comprised of both judicially-created limitations,
such as the prohibition on third-party standing ... and statutorily-imposed limitations, such as the Rule
17(a) requirement" that suits be maintained by the real party in interest. Gilmartin v. City of Tucson,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97641, 2006 WL 5917165 *4 (D. Ariz. 2006), citing Lee v. Deloitte & Touche

LLP, 428 F.Supp.2d 825, 831 (N .D. Ill. 2006).
Also, the Lujin Court held that "The 'irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" requires a
showing that the plaintiff has suffered an actual, concrete and particularized injury in fact, caused by the
defendant's conduct, which a favorable judgment will likely redress."' Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555,560. (1992).
Constitutional standing is a "threshold jurisdictional requirement, and cannot be waived." Pershing

Park Villas, 219 F.3d at 899-900; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 498-99; In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359,
366-67 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009).

PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT INITIATED THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER COMPLAINT
WITHOUT AUTHORITY, AND THE QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER PLAINTIFF HAD THE
AUTHORITY IS A FACTUAL QUESTION
As stated above, Idaho law also requires that the moving pm1y have standing to obtain foreclosure and
eviction. I.R.C.P. 17(a) requires that "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest." A real party in interest is "one who has a real, actual, material, or substantial interest in the
subject matter of the action." The owner of legal title is usually considered the real party in interest.

Caughey v. George Jensen & Sons, 74 Idaho 132, 134-35, 258 P.2d 357, 359 (1953). Questions of

.

standing must be decided before reaching the merits of the case. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v..

.

Carroll, 220 P .3d 1073, 1077 (Idaho, 2009). This requirement is upheld in all states.
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In Ryker v. Current (In re Ryker), 301 B.R. 156 (2003) the Com1 held that:
Standing is subject to review at all stages of litigation because a lack of standing undermines the
jurisdiction of not only the bankruptcy court, but also the district court acting as an appellate tribunal. See
In re Dionisio, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 12432, No. 02-3020 (3RD Cir. Apr. 17, 2003)(citing Bender v.
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546-7, 89 L. Ed. 2d 501,106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986)). In In re
Dionisio, neither this Court nor the Bankruptcy Com1 considered the issue of standing and, on appeal, the
Third Circuit held that, in the context of a Chapter 7 proceeding, the debtor lacked standing because the
trustee alone had standing to raise certain issues before the bankruptcy court and to prosecute appeals. The
result was a waste of judicial resources. The Court therefore hopes to avoid a possible similar outcome by
affording the Bankruptcy Court the opportunity to consider whether the Debtor had standing to exercise
the trustee's avoidance powers and thereby commence the fraudulent transfer action pursuant to § 548.
In Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546-47 (1986) the Court held that:

" ... showing the existence of a justiciable "case" or "controversy" under Article Ill, must affirmatively
appear in the record. 8 As the first Justice Harlan observed, "the presumption ... is that the court below
was without jurisdiction" unless "the contrary appears affirmatively from the record." King Bridge Co. v.
Otoe County, 120 U.S. 225,226 (1887). Accord, Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207,210 (1904);
Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 62-63 (1904). That lack of standing was not noticed by
either party matters not, for as we said in Mansfield C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379,382 (1884):

"[The] rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States, is inflexible
and without exception, which requires this court, of its own motion, to deny its own jurisdiction, and, in
the exercise of its appellate power, that of all other courts of the United States, in all cases where such
jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record on which, in the exercise of that power, it is
called to act. On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that ofjurisdiction,
first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes. This question the court is bound
to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of
the pa,1ies to it. "(Emphasis Added)
Accord, Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Willard, 220 U.S. 413,419 (1911); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1,
35-36 (1906); Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900). See Thomas v.
Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442,446 (1942). Moreover, because it is not "sufficient thatjmisdiction may be inferred
argumentatively from averments in the pleadings," Grace v. American Central Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278,284
(1883); Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S., at 210, it follows that the necessary factual predicate may
not be gleaned from the briefs and arguments themselves. This "first principle of federal jurisdiction"
applies "whether the case is at the trial stage or the appellate stage." P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, &
H. Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 835-836 (2d ed. 1973).
8 "The rules of standing, whether as aspects of the Art. III case-or-controversy requirement or as
reflections of prudential considerations defining and limiting the role of the courts, are threshold
determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention. It is the responsibility of the complainant clearly to
allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party· to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute and the
exercise of the court's remedial powers." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-518 (1975). See McNutt v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 190 (1936) ("Here, the allegation in the bill of complaint
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as to jurisdictional amount was traversed by the answer. The court made no adequate finding upon that
issue of fact, and the record contains no evidence to support the allegation of the bill. There was thus no
showing that the District Court had jurisdiction and the bill should have been dismissed upon that
ground"); Jackson v. Ashton, 8 Pet. 148, 149 (1834); Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dall. 382, 383-384 (1798).

It is well settled that unless a moving party has standing, both federal state district courts lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to address the merits of the case. In the absence of standing, there is no "case or
controversy" between the moving party and Petitioner which serves as the basis for the exercise of judicial
power under Article Ill of the constitution. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206,
45 L. Ed. 2d 343 ( 1975). '"In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the
court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.' Warth, 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45
L.Ed.2d 343 ( 1975). Thus, standing must be inquired into as part of the court's determination of whether it
has subject matter jurisdiction. Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710 (5th Cir. 1999). If the court finds that
it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it has a duty to dismiss the case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (1 ). Standing,
therefore, determines the courts' "fundamental power even to hear the suit." Grant ex rel. Family

Eldercare v. Gilbert, 324 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2003) citing Ford v. Nylcare Health Plans, Inc., 301
F.3d 329, 333 (5th Cir.2002).
In addition to the constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must also satisfy three prndential standing
restrictions. See ibid. First, a plaintiff must "assert his own legal 1ights and interests, and cannot rest his
claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (citations omitted).
Second, a plaintiffs claim must be more than a "generalized grievance" that is pervasively shared by a
large class of citizens. Coal Operators, 291 F.3d at 916 (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75). Third,
in statutory cases, the plaintiffs claim must fall within the "zone of interests" regulated by the statute in
question. Ibid.

"These additional restrictions enforce the p1inciple that, 'as a prndential matter, the

.plaintiff must be a proper proponent, and the action a proper vehicle, to. vindicate the rights asserted."'

Coal Operators, 291 F.3d at 916 (quoting Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 926 F.2d 573, 576 (6th
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Cir.1991 ).
"A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating standing and must plead its components with

specificity." Coal Operators, 291 F.3d at 916.
The United States District Court of Idaho, in ln re Sheridan, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 552 at
Headnote #9, the Court held that,
"a motion must be brought by a party in interest, with standing. This means the motion must be
brought by one who has a pecuniary interest in the case and, in connection with secured debts, by the
entity that is entitled to payment from the debtor and to enforce security for such payment. That entity is
the real party in interest. It must bring the motion or, if the motion is filed by a servicer or nominee or
other agent with claimed authority to bring the motion, the motion must identify and be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest."

In Norwood v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, A-09-CA-940-JRN, January 19t\ 2011, Report &
Recommendation at page 9, the Court held,
"Because [Defendant] has not produced evidence when, if ever, it had possession of the Note, or that
the instrument was lost, destroyed, or stolen, or that any other recognized exception to the requirement of
possession exists, it has failed to cany its burden in demonstrating an entitlement to ldismissal].
[Defendant] denied Norwood's contention that a physical transfer was not made from Chase Bank to
[Defendant], but it does not affirmatively demonstrate that the Note was in fact transfened. [Defendant,
as movant, bears the burden of demonstrating its entitlement to [dismissal]. It has failed to carry this
burden."

Cow1s across the country have applied this standard to Mortgage Notes and Deed of Trusts.
Mere possession of the Note does not make Respondent a "holder" of the Note. Under Idaho law, to
qualify as a holder, one must be in possession of the instrument, and the instrument must be properly
endorsed. This is generally the same as California law. See In re Hwang, 396 B.R. at 762. Although the
payee of an instrument may negotiate it, the payee must indorse it as well as deliver it to another person,
who then can become its holder. See the Idaho Deed of Trnst Act and definitions thereunder. There is no
evidence in the record that the original holder indorsed the Note and timely transferred it to Respondent.
Thus, mere possession of the Note and Deed of Trust does not provide Respondent with standing.
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Since the filing of this case in May 2011, Breinholts/Appellants and this court have asked Plaintiff to
Show how they have standing. That is over three years they have had to prove up standing. The best
deception they answered with is as "the purchaser in good faith at the sale".
There are no credible documents in evidence which support a claim.
According to Rule l 2(b) the Court has to have jurisdiction over the subject otherwise the Court has to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Additionally, Breinholts have plead at length the application of Rule 17a but again the court has
ignored the rule.
Rule 8(b)(6) which holds "An allegation .. .is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the
allegation is not denied .... "
According to Rule 12 (b) and 56 The Court needs to dismiss the case for lack of standing which
renders the court without Jurisdiction to hear the case.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the record in this case and evidence presented, Appellants herein seeks a
remand to the lower court to dismiss this case for ( 1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter due to
Respondent's lack of standing, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) for abuse of discretion with
instructions, and/or (4) remand for an evidentiary on the Appellants' claims in this case.

:17\../

Respectfully submitted, this ~day o

REI.OLT ~

~-~a~

SUSAN BREINHOLT
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